The L1 Weekly Report is published every Friday, focusing on the development of Layer 1 blockchains. If you have any suggestions, feel free to contact [email protected].

Bitcoin

• Zero-fee commitments for mobile wallets
  • The article proposes zero-fee commitments for mobile wallets, enabling users to create off-chain transactions with deferred settlement to avoid upfront fees. By leveraging cryptographic commitments and time-locked batching, mobile users can interact with the blockchain cost-effectively while maintaining security. This design reduces friction for frequent microtransactions (e.g., tipping, IoT payments) and improves user experience without burdening the base layer. The approach balances scalability and decentralization by minimizing on-chain footprint while ensuring eventual settlement integrity.
• Best-(Worst-)Case MEVil Response
  • This article examines strategies for addressing Miner Extractable Value (MEV) exploitation, weighing best- and worst-case responses to mitigate its negative impacts. It discusses protocol-level adjustments, auction mechanisms, and regulatory interventions to limit MEV-driven manipulation while preserving network efficiency. The analysis highlights trade-offs between decentralization, fairness, and economic incentives for validators/miners. Worst-case scenarios include unchecked MEV centralization and user trust erosion, while optimal solutions aim to balance transparency, accountability, and permissionless participation. The piece emphasizes proactive design choices to align stakeholder incentives and minimize systemic risks from MEV extraction.

Ethereum

• Reasons to have higher L1 gas limits even in an L2-heavy Ethereum
  • The article by Vitalik Buterin argues that Ethereum’s scalability should prioritize a modular Layer 1 + Layer 2 approach, where Layer 1 focuses on decentralized security and base protocol upgrades (e.g., sharding), while Layer 2 solutions like optimistic rollups handle high transaction throughput and reduce fees. He emphasizes that pure “Layer 1 scaling” alone isn’t sustainable and highlights the importance of integrating decentralized execution environments (e.g., Celestia) to further enhance scalability and flexibility.
• The road to Post-Quantum Ethereum transaction is paved with Account Abstraction (AA)
  • The article discusses integrating account abstraction (AA) with post-quantum cryptography to future-proof Ethereum transactions against quantum threats, leveraging AA’s flexibility to enable quantum-resistant signature schemes (e.g., lattice-based or hash-based) without requiring hard forks. It highlights how AA’s programmable transaction validation can smoothly transition Ethereum to post-quantum security while maintaining backward compatibility. The approach aims to mitigate quantum risks like private key exposure by decoupling signature verification logic from core protocol layers.
• The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Relay-Based DAS
  • The article explores the efficiency of relay-based data availability sampling (DAS) in blockchain scalability, arguing that relay networks can streamline data verification by offloading sampling tasks to specialized nodes. This approach reduces bandwidth and computational burdens on individual nodes while maintaining decentralized trust assumptions. It highlights how relay-based DAS balances scalability with security, enabling lightweight clients to participate in verifying large datasets (e.g., rollup data). The model’s “unreasonable effectiveness” lies in its ability to leverage existing relay infrastructure for cost-efficient, high-throughput data availability without compromising decentralization.
• Programmable settlement layer for multi-agent dApps
  • The article proposes a programmable settlement layer for Ethereum to enable complex multi-agent DApps by allowing developers to define custom transaction settlement logic (e.g., fee models, validation rules) directly at the protocol level. It suggests leveraging modular architecture and smart contract-like flexibility to streamline interactions between autonomous agents (e.g., DAOs, bots) while maintaining security and minimizing gas overhead. The design aims to enhance interoperability and scalability for decentralized systems requiring coordinated, trustless execution across multiple entities.
• Web2 Nullifiers using vOPRF
  • The article introduces Web2 nullifiers using verifiable oblivious pseudorandom functions (VOPRF) to enable privacy-preserving authentication or revocation mechanisms in centralized systems. It proposes leveraging VOPRFs to let users prove actions (e.g., account deletion) without revealing identities, preventing abuse (e.g., duplicate sign-ups) while hiding sensitive data. This approach bridges Web2 services with Web3-like privacy guarantees, allowing platforms to cryptographically enforce policies (e.g., one account per user) without tracking personal info. The design aims to enhance user anonymity in traditional systems while maintaining trust and compliance.
• Toward a General Model for Proposer Selection Mechanism Design
  • This article explores design frameworks for proposer selection mechanisms in blockchain consensus protocols, emphasizing fairness, decentralization, and security. It analyzes existing approaches like Proof-of-Stake and proposes a generalized model balancing predictable selection with randomness to prevent manipulation. The author discusses trade-offs between deterministic and stochastic methods, suggesting hybrid solutions incorporating stake-weighted probabilities and verifiable delay functions. Key considerations include resistance to grinding attacks, adaptive resource requirements, and compatibility with different network conditions. The model aims to provide a flexible foundation for optimizing proposer selection across diverse blockchain architectures while maintaining cryptographic robustness.
• Pricing Transactions for Preconfirmation
  • This article discusses mechanisms for pricing transaction preconfirmations (preconfs) in blockchain protocols to enable faster user guarantees. It explores frameworks for fee markets where users bid for prioritized inclusion, addressing challenges like fairness, frontrunning resistance, and alignment with existing fee structures. The author analyzes auction-based models and dynamic pricing strategies that adapt to network demand while preventing manipulation. Key considerations include integrating preconf pricing with base layer security, managing time-sensitive trade-offs, and designing incentive-compatible systems for proposers. The proposals aim to balance user experience improvements with protocol sustainability, leveraging cryptographic commitments and reputation-based scoring for robust preconf markets.